We need to learn quickly to keep up with the massive change around us so we don't get run over. We need to outrun change.
Previous posts listed the strategic nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in 1990.
This discussion will compare the total inventories and then calculate my wild guesses for weapons on daily alert.
Full disclosure: Back in the bad old days of the Cold War, I was a tiny little cog in the ICBM forces listed below.
Here is a comparison of total inventory for each country:
Continue reading “Alert status and comparison of US and Soviet strategic arsenals in 1990.”
Nice photos of P-38 Lightning, courtesy of U.S. Air Force:
Been wondering why I’m continuing my posts on nuclear weapons? Especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic?
Here are the first few reasons that come to mind:
Continue reading “Why all these discussions of nuclear weapons, especially now?”
In my research on nuclear armaments came across a superb resource: Physics and Nuclear Arms Today (Readings from Physics Today)
(Update 4/2/20: Title of post revised.)
The book has lots of articles from the early 1980s through 1991. I bought the book especially for one specific article in 1983 dealing with US and Soviet nuclear forces. The gold mine in that article was a detailed inventory of strategic weaponry as of 1990. It gives a detailed listing of U.S. and Soviet land, submarine, and air based strategic weapons, including count, yield, equivalent megaton, and circular error probable (CEP). Lots of info I’ve been seeking for a long time.
The previous post gave info on US weapons. This post describes the Soviet inventory. Third post will make some comparisons.
First I’ll give my recap of the info and then do a little analysis. Width limits on web pages mean there will be multiple tables.
Continue reading “Inventory and accuracy of Soviet nuclear weapons in 1990.”
Came across a superb resource during my research on nuclear armaments: Physics and Nuclear Arms Today (Readings from Physics Today)
(Update 4/2/20: Title of post revised.)
The book has articles from the early 1980s through 1991. Lots of good stuff. I bought the book especially for one article from 1983 dealing with US and Soviet nuclear forces. The gold mine in that article was a detailed inventory of strategic weaponry as of 1990. It gives a detailed listing of U.S. and Soviet land, submarine, and air based strategic weapons, including count, yield, equivalent megaton, and circular error probable (CEP). Lots of info I’ve been looking for a long time.
Information in that table is credited to The Military Balance 1989-90. At a price of over $200 for the paperback, don’t think I’ll be buying my own copy.
This post will give info on US weapons. Next post will describe the Soviet inventory. Third post will make some comparisons. Width limits on web pages mean there will be multiple tables. Continue reading “Inventory and accuracy of U.S. nuclear weapons in 1990.”
When will we be done with this stay-at-home restriction?
When will the economy recover?
When will we be back to “normal?”
I don’t know the dates for any of those transitions.
I have a suggestion for you.
Don’t set a specific date in your mind. Instead firmly set in your mind that this mess will end, we will get through it, we will survive, and we will thrive at the end.
What is the danger of setting a date in your mind and having faith it will be over on that date?
Let me introduce you to the Stockdale paradox.
Admiral James Stockdale was an American pilot shot down during the Vietnam war. He was a prisoner in North Vietnam for 7 1/2 years, routinely subject to brutal torture, legs broken twice during interrogation, and held in solitary confinement during four of those years with his legs locked in a metal stock each night. He was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor a few years after his release.
I think we should listen to him. His physical courage and moral courage are a role model for all of us.
For one explanation of the phenomenon he described check out article titled The Stockdale Paradox.
Who did not come home from captivity?
How do we get enough of the respirators, personal protective equipment, and medicine we need to get through the COVID-19 pandemic?
Fascinating to watch the press conference Saturday 3/21/20 with various federal officials and members of the coronavirus task force. Most fascinating feature was looking at the various comments and questions/answers from an economics perspective. Thought about Friday’s briefing as well.
Here is the difference in perspective I perceived: do we rely on capitalism or fascism as our model to get things done?
Underlying the comments from all the federal officials is the idea that the private sector can figure out how to provide everything we need.
The common thread underlying a huge portion of the questions from media is the idea that the federal government should tell which specific companies how much of which specific products to produce, specify they price they will charge, and provide the addresses for where to send each pallet of supplies.
In other words, should we use a capitalist model to provide goods we need or should we use the fascist model?
As a thumbnail description, in the fascist economic model the means of production are owned by the private sector but the central planning authority tells companies how much of which product to produce. In contrast, the next step away from freedom is communism, in which the means of production are owned by the government and a central planning agency decides how much of each specific product to produce.
Capitalism?
In the Soviet Union and Venezuela, grocery shopping involved/involves listening for rumors of which store got a shipment overnight, standing in line for hours, looking at lots of empty shelves, and going to the store daily to see if what you need might actually be on the shelf today.
If you have been awake the last seven days, you know that is what grocery shopping looks like in the U.S. today.
The difference between the Evil Empire and the worker’s paradise of Venezuela on one hand and the United States on the other hand is that the supply chain in the U.S. is still stocking the shelves and in a week or two or three will have them filled up.
Uh oh.
Production in North Dakota dropped in January, which is typical. Look at the production chart and you can pick out each of the winters because production usually falls off.
However, the price has fallen through the floor, courtesy of Saudi Arabia and Russia kicking off a price war and declaring they will flood the market with increased production.
Crude oil prices dropped in February and have continued in free fall during March. Prices on 3/17/20 per the Director’s Cut report are all the way down to $18.50 for North Dakota light sweet and $23.60 for the North Dakota market estimate.
Production in January 2020 dropped to 1,429,515 bopd (preliminary), off 47,262 bopd from January (revised) and down 89,515 bopd from December’s record high.
Price data:
Production data since 2008: Continue reading “Oil production in North Dakota shows usual drop in January 2020. Price takes a nose dive.”
Classic photos of the F-86 Sabre, all of which appear to be from the 1950s. Some have 1940s tag.
All of the following photos are courtesy of the U.S. Air Force photo website. Comments under each photo are from the USAF site. Current style is to identify where and when a photo was taken with specific mention of the photographer. Attribution is a bit vague for these.
Yeah, Ben Davis in flight. Cool, huh? How ’bout Chuck Yeager and Jackie Cochran on the ground?
Final set of cool pictures of Heritage Flight presentations, all courtesy of U.S. Air Force:
A-10, P-51, F-16, and F-4:
P-51 and F-15:
The primary reason I bought Physics and Nuclear Arms Today (Readings from Physics Today) is for one particular article: The nuclear arsenals of the US and USSR, by Barbara Levi, originally published in March 1983.
As mentioned elsewhere in this series of posts, a table in the article has been updated to reflect weapon inventory in 1990.
The article describes developments in 1983.
Previous post described the probability that various weapons would destroy a target hardened to the level of a Minuteman silo.
Equivalent Megatons
Article introduced to me a concept of equivalent megatons (EMT). When comparing effects of nuclear weapons at different yields the kiloton rating cannot be used. The relative destructive power varies based on the yield on megaton raised to the 2/3 power. The formula is: EMP = mt^(2/3) .
In the US, we have about 40% of our EMT on bombers, with another 40% of EMT on ICBM’s, with the remainder on submarines. Because of the smaller yield, about half of the count of weapons is on subs.
In the Soviet Union, about 80% of the EMT is in the ICBM force with about 15% on submarines and a mere 5% on bombers.
Article says that in 1983 about 50% of the US SSBNs ( nuclear missile armed subs, or boomers) were on patrol at a time while only about 15% of the Soviet boomers were at sea at any one moment.
Continue reading “Comments on US and Soviet arsenals in 1983 – #2”
More cool pictures of Heritage Flight presentations, all courtesy of U.S. Air Force:
Nice view from underneath of two P-51s and an F-15, with great comparison of relative size. Notice space used for engine(s) for visual of relative power, with intake, engine, and exhaust of F-15 being about same length as an entire P-51:
P-51, F-16, and F-15:
Came across a great resource on nuclear armaments as I browsed the web looking for some particular information. The book is Physics and Nuclear Arms Today (Readings from Physics Today)
It has lots of articles from the late 1970s through 1991. Reason I bought the book is for one specific article in 1983 dealing with US and Soviet nuclear forces. A table within that article was updated with a detailed inventory of strategic weaponry as of 1990. Several posts will discuss the 1990 inventory in detail.
Likelihood of destroying a hardened missile silo
Continue reading “Comments on US and Soviet nuclear arsenals in 1983 – #1”
Saudi Arabia and Russia had a falling-out over the weekend about controlling production levels and prices. As a result Saudi Arabia is going to cut prices and increase production.
They have announced they will cut prices by somewhere between $6 and $8 a barrel in April, depending on destination.